Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Philosophy. Show all posts

Monday, December 22, 2025

The Relevance of Communication Theory (Preface to the Finnish translation of "Communication Theory as a Field")

The following is the English source text of my preface to the Finnish translation, by Saila Poutiainen and Mats Bergman, of my 1999 article, "Communication Theory as a Field." The translated article, including the preface, appears in the Finnish open-access journal, Media & Viestintä. Full citation: Poutiainen, S., & Bergman, M. (2025). Viestinnän teorian kenttä [Communication Theory as a Field]. Media & viestintä, 48(4), 167-216. https://doi.org/10.23983/mv.177427 

With the welcome appearance of a Finnish translation of “Communication Theory as a Field” (CTF), I would like to take this opportunity to offer brief comments on the article’s current relevance and how my own thinking about it has changed through more than 25 years since it first appeared in English (Craig, 1999). 

Although its seven traditions are often said to map the field of communication theory, the central claim of CTF was not to propose a definitive map but rather a “constitutive metamodel,” a framework for representing and building theory for a practical discipline of communication, illustrated by a tentative scheme of seven traditions. The essential purpose of a practical discipline would be to cultivate communication as a social practice, and a field of theory for a practical discipline would serve that purpose by cultivating inquiry, dialogue, and debate regarding alternative conceptual models of and for the practice of communication (Craig, 2018). 

The constitutive metamodel renders the multidisciplinary diversity of communication theory as an open set of intellectual traditions, each characterized by a distinct fundamental conception of communication, vocabulary for framing problems, and points of intersection (agreement or disagreement) with ordinary practical beliefs about communication. CTF announced this scheme not as a static map of the field but as a dynamic intervention to “jump start” a conversation through which the field itself would evolve in unforeseeable ways to produce new and redefined theoretical traditions and new ways of representing and applying them. This “theoretical metadiscourse” would contribute to society by enriching the “practical metadiscourse,” that shapes the understanding and practice of communication in everyday life. 

In the event, CTF may have failed to “jump start” quite the energetic, field-constituting dialogue and debate across traditions that it idealistically envisioned, but it has been influential, and I believe it continues to be relevant. While textbook summaries indeed often reduce the constitutive metamodel to a map, grid, or list of communication theory’s seven traditions, scholars have also commented critically on the matrix of traditions, defined traditions beyond the original seven, and creatively adapted and applied the scheme in various ways (see: Craig, 2015; Rich & Robles, 2021). CTF is still widely cited, and scholars in other disciplines often cite the article to document any mention of communication theory. 

Thus, CTF not only mapped the field of communication theory but has, in a sense, put the field of communication theory “on the map” with a citable location among the disciplines. Even so, the pragmatist philosophy of practical discipline that underlies the constitutive metamodel has received relatively little attention. What has had more uptake is the idea that communication theory is, for better or worse, a diverse, fragmented field of thought that has developed in multiple traditions. Without consideration of its underlying philosophy, however, the purpose of a pluralistic metamodel (“dialogical-dialectical coherence”) and its relevance to contemporary communication and media studies may not be apparent. 

Here we should emphasize an important distinction. If CTF maps the field, what it maps is not subfields of communication and media studies but rather fundamental conceptions of the practice of communication that apply across subfields: communication as a practical art (rhetoric), communication as mediation by signs (semiotics), communication as information processing (cybernetics), and so on. The metamodel includes no media studies tradition, no communication technology tradition, no organizational communication tradition, nor others of the like, because such categories refer to fields of study, but not to distinct fundamental conceptions of communication. Communication can be, and historically has been, theorized rhetorically, semiotically, cybernetically, and otherwise in each of those fields of study. Hence, it is not a defect of the constitutive metamodel that the traditions fail to represent the disciplinary substructure of communication and media studies. The metamodel is intended to be relevant to all areas of communication research and practice but in a different way: as a device for focusing attention on alternative fundamental conceptions of communication and their practical implications. 

For example, if we examine media studies through the constitutive metamodel, we can see that media-related theories have ranged across the traditions of communication theory, most prominently sociopsychological, sociocultural, and critical, but also cybernetic, semiotic, and rhetorical. Categorizing theories in this manner may not be of much interest, but reflecting on the problems of media communication as conceived in different traditions can generate interesting questions. From the standpoint of phenomenological conceptions of communication as dialogue, the very mediated-ness of media communication may appear as a problem in contrast to the greater dialogical potential of direct personal interaction, but this view is also highly debatable as shown by Peters’s (1994) provocative argument that the gap between transmission and reception is so fundamental to all communication that mass communication may be considered the most basic form. Every tradition in the metamodel provides a vocabulary for theorizing the gaps of which communication is made (speaker-audience in rhetoric, signifier-signified in semiotics; transmission-reception in cybernetics, and so on), but we could consider also the possible usefulness of parsing out a distinct “mediational” tradition in which communication would be defined as mediation and communication problems would be framed in a vocabulary of gaps, media, and mediated relations. Conceptualizing such a tradition, situating it historically and culturally, putting it in conversation with other traditions in the metamodel, and applying it to problems in the field of media studies would be creative work in communication theory. 

How has my thinking about communication theory changed since 1999? If I were to revise CTF now, I would, of course, tweak it here and there, partly in response to critics, but my case for the constitutive metamodel of communication theory as a field would remain essentially the same, as would my presentation of the seven traditions. The matrix of traditions was always intended to serve as an illustration of how to analyze the field through the constitutive metamodel, not as a definitive representation of the field, and it still serves well as an exemplar. My revision of CTF would emphasize even more strongly the openness and instrumental adaptability of the scheme of traditions, and that we should think of the metamodel, not as a sturdy edifice to be built for the ages, but as a way of thinking to be practiced. Three themes that have grown in my work since 1999 would reinforce that emphasis: (1) the dynamic interaction of theory and practice in the medium of metadiscourse; (2) the cultural basis of theoretical and practical metadiscourse; and (3) the necessity and usefulness of selecting and adapting elements of the metamodel for specific analytical purposes.  

First, CTF regards communication theory as a field of “metadiscursive practice” that “intersects with and potentially informs the ongoing practical metadiscourse of society” (Craig, 1999, p. 119). The social usefulness of communication theory in this view is that it contributes well-considered ways of talking about communication problems and practices that are relevant and informative for ordinary ways of communicating. In the years since CTF, empirical studies of practical metadiscourse have given me a fuller and livelier sense of this potential for dialogue between theory and practice, finding both that ordinary talk about communication is surprisingly rich in concepts that can inform theory, and that the traditions of communication theory can be made relevant and applicable to practical discourse on communication problems (Craig, 2020). This dynamic metadiscursive practice would not be well served by a static metamodel of theoretical traditions. 

Second, CTF holds that theories are relevant to practice insofar as they both appeal rhetorically to certain commonplace beliefs about communication and challenge other beliefs. What I would emphasize more strongly now is that these commonplace beliefs or ordinary ways of talking about communication are culturally based. They are elements of a communication culture that varies with the general culture. This unavoidable fact would obviously pose a problem for a static metamodel that defined theoretical traditions, in part, by their relevance to commonplace beliefs. Theories will be variably relevant in different cultural contexts, and distinct traditions of communication theory can be reconstructed from the practical and intellectual traditions of specific cultures. This issue arises most acutely in the discourse on “de-westernizing” communication theory (Craig & Xiong, 2022), but it is worth considering in any cultural context. Are there distinctly Finnish thought traditions and ways of talking about communication that should inform the constitutive metamodel?  

Third, CTF mentions in an endnote that the number of traditions in the metamodel (seven) may be optimal for representing communication theory because cognitive scientists have found that we can hold about that many “chunks” of information in mind at one time (Craig, 1999, p. 156). However, CTF also points out that the metamodel is not limited in principle to seven or any number of traditions, and, in fact, scholars have already proposed several additional ones since 1999. This poses a problem if you imagine that every newly defined tradition should be incorporated with its own rows and columns in the “official” tabular representation of the metamodel. As traditions are added, the tables threaten to become quite unwieldy, and the task of engaging all the traditions with each other in the discussion of any problem threatens to exceed one’s mental capacity or at least the capacity of an article-length essay. My encounters with this problem have led me to emphasize more strongly that the constitutive metamodel is a way of thinking about communication theory, not a static tabular structure, and that the traditions are best approached as resources to be flexibly adapted and used for specific analytical purposes, as we did, for example, in a recent essay on the Buddhist and Confucian traditions of communication theory (Craig & Xiong, 2022).  

References

Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9(2), 119-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1999.tb00355.x 

Craig, R. T. (2015). The constitutive metamodel: A 16-year review. Communication Theory, 25(4), 356-374. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12076 

Craig, R. T. (2018). For a practical discipline. Journal of Communication, 68(2), 289-297. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqx013 

Craig, R. T. (2020). Models of communication in and as metadiscourse. In M. Bergman, K. Kirtiklis, & J. Siebers (Eds.), Models of communication: Theoretical and philosophical approaches (pp. 11-33). Routledge. 

Craig, R. T., & Xiong, B. (2022). Traditions of communication theory and the potential for multicultural dialogue. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 17(1), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2021.2009487 

Peters, J. D. (1994). The gaps of which communication is made. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 11, 117-140. https://doi.org/10.1080/15295039409366891

Rich, M. H., & Robles, J. S. (Eds.). (2021). Practicing communication theory: Exploring, applying, and teaching the constitutive metamodel. Cognella.


Wednesday, February 12, 2025

Traditions of Communication Theory: An Introduction to the Constitutive Metamodel

 


Above is a slide prepared for a lecture about the traditions of communication theory. It tries to encapsulate seven complex traditions of thought in just a few words. I've been using versions of this slide for many years, but it never looks quite right to me, so I tweak it for every new presentation. This is the latest version as of this writing, but I doubt it will be the last. 

The traditions of communication theory represent some basic options for framing communication problems. They first appeared in my 1999 article, "Communication Theory as a Field," as elements of the Constitutive Metamodel of communication theory. As I mentioned in an earlier post, much of my subsequent writing, including this blog, has grown out of ideas in that article. (For my current thinking on and "beyond" the seven traditions, check out this interview.)

Readers wanting to learn in depth about the Constitutive Metamodel and the traditions can use the sources listed below under Further Reading, some of which are available on my website. Descriptions of the metamodel that you'll find in popular communication theory textbooks are helpful but often a little misleading in my opinion, and free materials that people have posted online, almost always based on those second-hand textbook accounts, are usually worse. Except for a decent Wikipedia article that currently needs editing and updating, I haven't found an introduction to the metamodel free on the Web that I can strongly recommend. 

So, this post provides a free-online, accurate, and I hope fairly readable introduction to the Constitutive Metamodel and the traditions of communication theory. Borrowing some material from previous encyclopedia articles (Craig, 2009a, 2016), I'll start off by explaining the metamodel in general, then say more about the seven traditions, and I'll conclude by discussing criticisms of the metamodel and recent work that expands the traditions and suggests different applications. 

The Constitutive Metamodel

A model is a representation of something from some point of view. A metamodel is a model of models. It's a framework for describing and comparing different models of something. Every theory of communication is also a model of communication insofar as it represents the communication process from some point of view. The Constitutive Metamodel is a framework for describing and comparing different models of communication from the point of view of how they are relevant to practical problems. 

The metamodel is useful theoretically because it shows how diverse ideas about communication relate to each other, and it is useful practically because it gives us a wide range of perspectives on communication problems. It's called the "constitutive" metamodel because it is based on a constitutive model of communication--the idea that communication is a social process that constitutes, or produces, shared meaning. The Constitutive Metamodel is a model of communication in the field of communication theory. As such, it represents models of communication as ways of communicating about communication that constitute, or produce, alternative meanings of communication as a concept and a practice. 

We need a metamodel because communication theory is a wonderfully rich field of thought but also a very fragmented one. There has never been a single, generally accepted overall theory or core set of theories of communication. In fact, there are hundreds of  theories, and not only are they about different aspects of communication (such as media technologies or personal relationships), they often come from such different intellectual backgrounds that they can seem entirely unrelated to each other. How does a psychological theory of media effects relate to a critical theory of decolonizing communication, and what difference does it make for communication in practice? The metamodel gives us a way of thinking about questions like that. 

From the early decades of the 20th century, theories of communication sprang up in philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, speech, and many other fields of thought. Philosophers analyzed problems of language and meaning, sociologists looked at problems of urban community, psychologists studied problems of persuasion and group dynamics, and so on. I suspect that the topic of communication attracted such widespread intellectual attention because communication was increasingly felt to be an important problem in society. Each discipline developed theories by extending its own traditional ways of thinking to address some communication problems, but until the late 1940s there was still no awareness of "communication theory" as an overarching topic that included all of those theories. 

The term "communication theory" first appeared in the field of electrical engineering, where by the 1930s and '40s it referred to theories of signal coding and transmission--the origins of what I call the cybernetic tradition. As the academic discipline of communication began to be organized in the 1950s and '60s (a long story that can't be told here), the term "communication theory" was borrowed from the electrical engineers and became an umbrella term covering all theories of communication in all fields of thought. Although much has changed through the following decades, communication theorists continue to work in a variety of different intellectual traditions, so the field continues to be rich with ideas but also very fragmented. Yet, all of those disconnected theories have relevant things to say about communication problems in society, so there is common ground among them and a potential for productive dialogue about their practical differences.  

The Constitutive Metamodel tries to bring the field of communication theory together in a unified conversation without diminishing its rich diversity. The trick is to see how all communication theories are relevant to practical problems. In that pragmatic capacity, not only do most theories contribute something useful, they all have something in common to discuss and debate when we treat them as alternative models for framing practical problems.

The main ideas of the Constitutive Metamodel can be summarized in a few bullet points:

  • Communication is a culturally shaped concept and social practice, constituted in the ordinary metadiscourse (practical discourse about communication) that circulates in a society. In other words, how we understand and practice communication is shaped by common ways of talking about communication in our culture.
  • Communication theory is a technical practice of metadiscourse that interprets, critiques, and reconstructs ordinary metadiscourse to develop useful new ways of talking about (and thereby constituting) the practice of communication. Communication theory contributes to society by creating and disseminating practically relevant forms of metadiscourse that can be used to frame problems and discuss practices of communication in everyday situations.
  • Theories that are practically relevant are both plausible (consistent with some commonly held beliefs about communication) and interesting (challenge other common beliefs). For example, cybernetic theories are plausible because they build on certain commonplace ideas (e.g., that communication depends on information transfer) while also challenging other commonplace ideas (e.g., that humans are essentially different from machines). As such, cybernetic theories give us a unique perspective for framing and discussing a range of communication problems. 
  • A basis for debate between different theories is that they often disagree about the validity of some commonplace metadiscourse. For example, theories of genuine dialogue (in what I call the phenomenological tradition), contrary to cybernetic theories, generally challenge the idea that communication depends on information transfer while affirming that humans are essentially different from machines. This difference gives us two alternative perspectives on communication problems, one focused on information processing and the other on authentic human relationships. In this way, the diversity of communication theory can be a strength when it enables us to reflect on problems from different viewpoints. 
  • Theories of communication are both numerous and intellectually diverse, partly because they have developed independently in several different thought traditions, each with its own vocabulary, core assumptions, and relevance to ordinary metadiscourse. The Constitutive Metamodel argues that many ideas in communication theory are based on a smaller number of fundamentally different conceptions of communication, first presented in my 1999 article as the seven traditions of communication theory. It's important to emphasize that these traditions are not uniform or unchanging. Each tradition includes many contending theories and they all continue to evolve over time through ongoing innovation and debate. It's also important to emphasize that the metamodel is open-ended in principle and not limited to the original seven traditions. In fact several more traditions have already been recognized in the literature since 1999. Finally, theories often blend ideas from different traditions, so we can't expect every theory to fit neatly in one tradition. 

Traditions of Communication Theory

In the original article on the Constitutive Metamodel (Craig, 1999) the seven traditions were represented in the form of two tables, reproduced below. Feel free to skip over the tables. They may be hard to read on your device, and they refer to a lot of complex ideas that I can't explain in this short introduction to the metamodel. Instead, I'll say a few words about the overall structure of the tables and then return to the simplified version at the top of this post to say more about each tradition.

Table 1. Seven Traditions of Communication Theory (from Craig, 1999, p. 133)








The purpose of Table 1 is to display the seven traditions of  communication theory as forms of metadiscourse based on different fundamental conceptions of communication. Each tradition is summarized with regard to:
  • Its typical definition of communication,
  • Its general way of framing communication problems,
  • Some of its core vocabulary, 
  • Some commonplace ideas about communication that it affirms, and 
  • Some commonplace ideas about communication that it challenges.

Table 2. Topoi for Argumentation Across Traditions (from Craig, 1999, p. 134)










Table 2 illustrates points of disagreement among the traditions as a basis for theoretical debate across the field. In the column under each tradition, the table lists "topoi" or lines of argument from that tradition against each tradition. Because theoretical debate goes on within as well as between traditions, the diagonal cells of the table present lines of argument against each tradition from within the same tradition: rhetoric against rhetoric, semiotics against semiotics, and so on. As I've mentioned, this table alludes to a lot of complex ideas and it may be hard to make much sense of it until you have studied the traditions more deeply. 

With that in mind, let's return to the simplified picture at the top of this post and consider a brief sketch of each tradition (adapted from Craig, 2016).  

Rhetorical Tradition

  • Communication is the practical art of discourse.
  • Problems of communication involve choices about what to say and how in particular situations, depending on such factors as audience, purpose, and the available means of persuasion (reasons, emotions, stylistic devices).
Rhetorical theory originated in ancient Greek city-states where citizens participated in public juries and deliberative assemblies, and public speaking skills were highly valued. Popular teachers known as sophists wrote handbooks on techniques of effective speaking. Aristotle, in the first systematic philosophical treatise on rhetoric, defined it as the art of discovering the available means of persuasion and codified fundamental rhetorical concepts that continue to be used today. Through the Roman and medieval periods in the West, rhetoric was a standard school subject (part of the trivium), and a complex tradition of theoretical writings on rhetoric can be traced from ancient times down to the present. As the idea of communication gained currency in the 20th century, rhetorical theory also flourished and the scope of rhetoric was broadened from its roots in public speaking and written composition so that any communication could now be thought of as a form of rhetoric. In the rhetorical tradition, communication is a practical art of discourse, concerned with mastering techniques of communication, developing a critical awareness of techniques, and making wise choices about what and how to communicate in practical situations. 

Semiotic Tradition

  • Communication is the sharing of meaning through signs and symbols.
  • Problems of communication involve the use of signs and symbols (words, gestures, images, etc.) to express meaning, achieve understanding, and bridge gaps between different subjective viewpoints. Problems can arise from unfamiliarity, language differences, too much abstraction, or  unintended meanings that might be confusing or offensive. 
Semiotics, the theory of signs, sprang in its modern form from the 17th-century empiricist philosopher John Locke, who theorized that words stand for ideas in each person’s mind and that communication fails when people use words with different or unclear meanings. Under the influence of seminal thinkers such as Charles S. Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure, sophisticated theories were developed in the 20th century to explain types and systems of signs and how signs function in the mind and in society. For example, natural signs (e.g., smoke is a sign of fire) can be distinguished from symbolic signs (e.g., the word “fire” used in a speech about fire prevention) in that symbolic signs have shared meaning only as a matter of social convention. In the semiotic tradition, communication depends entirely on the production and interpretation of signs to share meaning or convey information. The practical concerns of rhetoric and semiotics overlap, but rhetoric has traditionally focused on persuasion while semiotics has focused on intersubjective understanding as the fundamental problem of communication. 

Phenomenological Tradition

  • Communication is the experience of self and other in dialogue. 
  • Problems of communication involve inauthentic ways of being and relating to others, such as one-way monologue, rejection of different views, or focus on an instrumental goal like persuading the other or projecting a certain image of oneself.
Phenomenological theory is concerned with communication as a subjective experience. In contrast to cybernetics, human consciousness and intentionality are essential to communication as theorized in this tradition. Phenomenological theory describes the forms of conscious experience through which we interpret and make sense of the world around us, including other people. Several contending schools of phenomenology developed in the 20th century from the work of major Continental philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. An important concept first theorized by the philosopher Martin Buber is that of genuine dialogue—an event of communion between people who experience each other as full persons with their own subjectivity (I–you) rather than as instrumental objects (I–it). The phenomenological tradition thus offers an ethical view of communication that values openness and authenticity and is critical of strategic (rhetorical) as well as mechanistic (cybernetic or sociopsychological) views. Phenomenology’s focus on our direct experience of others can be contrasted to the semiotic assumption that meaning can only be shared through signs, but current philosophers of communication often blend the two traditions, weaving signs and discourse into the fabric of conscious experience. 

Cybernetic Tradition

  • Communication is information processing in systems at all levels of complexity (machines, organisms, groups, organizations, societies). 
  • Problems of communication involve malfunctions in the flow of information such as too little or too much information, lack of feedback, runaway processes such as escalating conflict, or system breakdown. 
In the late 1940s, formal theories of communication developed by mathematicians and electrical engineers, especially Claude Shannon’s theory of information and Norbert Wiener’s theory of cybernetic feedback-control systems, attracted widespread attention in disciplines ranging from biology to psychology and the social sciences. At the dawn of the Information Age, these theories seemed to point the way to a rigorous science of communication that would explain how information functions in all complex systems including machines, biological organisms, and human society. Although the formal mathematics of these theories were not easily applied to human interaction, Shannon’s diagram of the linear model of communication (showing the flow of information from a source through a channel to a destination) became a staple of communication theory courses, and key terms such as information, redundancy, noise, and feedback were absorbed into ordinary language as a somewhat technical-sounding vocabulary for discussing communication. In the cybernetic tradition, communication is information processing in systems at all levels from machines to human societies, and problems of communication have to do with system malfunctions (such as information blockage in organizations or escalating conflict in interpersonal relations) rather than persuasion (contrary to the rhetorical tradition) or shared meaning (contrary to the semiotic tradition). In a cybernetic view, contrary to the phenomenological tradition, communication is a functional process that does not rely on conscious intentionality. Human consciousness itself is a form of information processing that is not different in its essential functioning from that of computing machines or other nonconscious systems.

Sociopsychological Tradition

  • Communication is a process of social behavior, interaction and influence, the causes and effects of which are determined by psychological variables such as personality, cognition, and emotion.
  • Problems of communication involve the use of psychological variables to affect behavior and interaction and to achieve desired outcomes, such as sales from advertising, public health, team motivation, or interpersonal closeness.
Scientific social psychology developed in the 20th century, roughly in parallel with phenomenology and in response to some related practical concerns about human relations, but it theorized communication, quite differently, as a process of behavioral interaction with psychological causes and effects. Leading social psychologists such as Kurt Lewin, Carl Hovland, and Gordon Allport developed theories of group dynamics, persuasion and social influence, rumor transmission, cognitive information processing, interpersonal attraction, and other communication-related phenomena that have been extensively applied and further developed in communication research to explain media effects and interpersonal interaction. This is the dominant theoretical tradition in current conceptions of communication research as a science. As a tradition focused on explaining the causes and effects of communication, sociopsychologcal theory appeals to a practical interest in diagnosing the causes of communication problems and finding effective solutions to control outcomes. Although both rhetoric and social psychology are concerned with communication techniques, rhetoric theorizes communication as an art adapted to each situation while social psychology pursues scientific generalizations. Although cybernetics and social psychology share a scientific orientation, sociopsychological theory does not equate machine and human communication but rather emphasizes the importance of distinctly human factors such as personality, emotion, and motivated cognition. 

Sociocultural Tradition

  • Communication is participation in society and culture. 
  • Problems of communication involve barriers to community and social cooperation, and can arise from factors such as cultural differences, social and cultural change, and community conflict. 
The sociocultural tradition of communication theory emerged under the influence of 19th and early 20th-century social theorists such as Emile Durkheim, Charles H. Cooley, John Dewey, and George H. Mead. In this tradition, communication is viewed as an essential process of human society. On the macro level of society as a whole, communication functions to integrate and coordinate the various institutions of a society. On the micro level of social interaction, our successful communication with one another depends on a shared context of social institutions and cultural patterns, which we both reproduce and flexibly adapt as we interact, thus contributing both to the maintenance of society and to the possibility of social change on the macro level. A problem for sociocultural theories is to explain how local interactions, in the aggregate, produce social and cultural patterns even while they depend on and reproduce existing patterns. The sociocultural tradition is concerned with practical communication problems such as collaboration and organization, social conflict and change, communication across cultural differences, and the quest for community in diverse, multicultural societies. Sociocultural theory criticizes the overemphasis on individual agency and the lack of attention to the macro level of society and culture in traditions such as rhetoric, phenomenology, and social psychology. It criticizes the tendency in traditions such as semiotics and cybernetics to abstract communication codes or functions from the rich context of social life in which they necessarily occur. 

Critical Tradition

  • Communication is discursive reflection, meaning that genuine communication requires free and open questioning of the social forces that condition and often distort communication.
  • Problems of communication involve hegemonic ideologies and unjust power relations that go unquestioned (with respect to social class, ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, disability, age, etc.) and that systematically distort the communication process to privilege certain views while excluding or marginalizing other views. 
The modern critical tradition of communication theory began in the mid-19th century with the Marxist critique of capitalist ideology and has evolved through the Frankfurt School critical theorists of the mid-20th century, and later Frankfurt School theorists such as Jurgen Habermas, to contemporary poststructuralism and identity-based critical movements that challenge oppressive ideologies of race, gender, sexuality, ability, and other dimensions of difference marked by unjust privilege and domination. For theorists in the critical tradition, most communication is distorted by ingrained ideological assumptions and power structures that perpetuate social injustice, and a practical purpose of communication theory is to cultivate forms of discursive reflection or communication that exposes oppressive ideology, freely questions the status quo, and promotes progressive social change. Turning this critique on the field of communication theory itself, critical-cultural theorists have centered the theoretical contributions of women and LGBTQ+ theorists, theorists of color, and non-Western indigenous thought traditions. If some other communication theorists criticize the critical tradition for politicizing science and scholarship, critical theorists criticize other traditions for upholding a sham political neutrality that implicitly serves dominant interests. 

Criticisms, Applications, and Extensions

The Constitutive Metamodel has been mentioned thousands of times in the academic literature, most often simply as a way of nodding toward communication theory in general or toward the traditions or some other idea in the metamodel. Substantial criticisms, applications, and extensions of the metamodel have also been published, and several traditions of communication theory have been introduced in addition to the original seven. Listed below under Further Reading are good sources for learning more about these developments: Craig (2009b), Craig (2015), Craig & Xiong (2022), and Rich & Robles (2021). I'll just quickly mention some criticisms and applications of the metamodel, and will conclude with brief summaries of four newly-proposed traditions.  

First, here in gist are some of the main criticisms of the metamodel and responses to those criticisms:  
  • Epistemological bias: The metamodel represents the field of communication theory from a social constructionist stance as opposed to a naturalistic, scientific stance. In other words, the metamodel sees communication as a social practice that we can constitute in different forms depending on how we talk about it (metadiscourse) as opposed to a natural phenomenon that can be described and explained scientifically. One response to this criticism is to point out that the metamodel does include scientific theories (in the social psychological, cybernetic, and other traditions), but even though some aspects of communication may be naturally determined by biological or other factors that can be discovered scientifically, the practice of communication is still culturally shaped in many ways. Scientific theories can become part of the culture that shapes our understanding and practice of communication. 
  • Western bias:  The metamodel is entirely based on Western (chiefly European and North American) thought traditions, and therefore it may have limited relevance for communication theory and practice in Asian, African, and other non-Western cultures. In an article co-authored with Bingjuan Xiong (Craig & Xiong, 2022), we proposed to correct this bias by expanding the metamodel to include non-Western traditions of communication theory, starting with Confucian and Buddhist traditions. 
  • Misalignment with current research areas:  Communication scholars often complain that they can't really place themselves or their theories in any of the seven traditions as defined in the metamodel, even if they nominally work in one of them. For researchers at the forefront of fields like rhetoric, semiotics, or phenomenology, the definitions of those traditions may seem too simplistic and/or old-fashioned to capture current thinking. Other scholars often feel that the metamodel excludes, or at least underemphasizes, theories in their own field of expertise, whether it be media ecology, public relations, or communication biology. One way of responding to these criticisms has been to add new traditions to the metamodel to fill gaps, so far including a Pragmatist tradition and a Spiritual tradition, in addition to the Confucian and Buddhist traditions already mentioned. (See below for more on these four traditions.)  Another way of responding to the criticisms is to point out that the traditions are intended to identify different fundamental conceptions of communication, which don't necessarily correspond to current sub-fields of communication. For example, there is no public relations tradition in the metamodel because that field does not have a fundamentally distinct conception of communication, but public relations theories use ideas from several of the traditions including rhetoric, semiotics, social psychology, and others. 
Second, although the metamodel has been criticized for certain biases and limitations, it has nevertheless proven to be a useful way of representing the field of communication theory. Here in gist are two main ways of applying the metamodel: 
  • Teaching communication theory:  The metamodel is a useful tool for helping students to make sense of communication theory as a field and to apply communication theories to problems in everyday life, by showing how theories in the field are based on a smaller number of fundamentally different conceptions of communication (the traditions) that all have different practical implications. Most communication theory textbooks include the metamodel in some fashion, and many teachers have developed creative ways of presenting and using it in their courses. You'll find great examples of this in Practicing communication theory: Exploring, applying, and teaching the constitutive metamodel, a book edited by Marc H. Rich and Jessica S. Robles (see below under Further Reading).
  • Critically reflecting on theories and subfields: Scholars have used the metamodel to finds points of comparison for analyzing particular theories or entire subfields of communication in terms of how they relate to other theories or to practical problems. Some of these analyses have looked at which traditions are being applied to a problem or topic area and have pointed out gaps that could be filled by applying different traditions. For examples of this type of application in social thought, phenomenology, interpersonal communication, and even robot communication, see Craig (2015, pp. 359-360).
Third, the metamodel has been extended to include traditions beyond the original seven. (Adding traditions to the metamodel faces some challenges as discussed by Craig, 2015, and Craig & Xiong, 2022.) Here in gist are four traditions that have been proposed so far: 

Pragmatist Tradition (Craig, 2007)

  • Communication is pluralistic community, the coordination of practical activities among diverse people and groups through discourse and reflective inquiry.
  • Problems of communication involve a "paradox of pluralism" because to fully embrace diversity in a community means taking a standpoint that takes no particular standpoint. 
Building on previous work by Chris Russill, Craig (2007) explicated a pragmatist tradition of communication theory that began in the late 19th century in the work of American Pragmatist philosophers such as William James, C.S Pierce, and John Dewey. For theorists in this tradition, communication problems arise from the difficulty of achieving consensus on matters of common concern among the diverse interests and incommensurable worldviews in complex modern societies. Pragmatist communication theory is concerned with forms of discourse that enable the creation and maintenance of cooperative, pluralistic communities in response to such problems. This tradition not only exists in the field and offers a distinct conception of communication, it makes clear that the Constitutive Metamodel itself is a pragmatist theory of communication: a model in the field as well as of the field. 

Spiritual Tradition (Rich, 2014) 

  • Communication is mimetic of the atemporal (non-material) plane of reality. 
  • Problems of communication involve the ineffable nature of spiritual truth. "These problems include denial of the atemporal, discerning the mimetic of the atemporal, and failing to overcome the material nature of communication to grasp the inner atemporal purity of the message better" (Rich, 2014, p. 140).
"Rich ... has proposed a spiritual tradition of communication theory in which communication is conceived as mimetic of the atemporal. This tradition is based on a dualistic distinction between the temporal, material world in which we practice human communication and an atemporal, spiritual plane of truth that can influence our temporal beliefs and practices when we manage to connect with it, but that is not in any way influenced, much less socially constructed, through human interaction. Normative human communication can represent atemporal truth, but only imperfectly. Among many writings on communication in the spiritual tradition Rich cites classical works of Plato and Augustine, certain strains of American pragmatism, and contemporary works including those of several communication scholars. Having defined the spiritual tradition, Rich puts it in conversation with the eight previously defined traditions in the field, noting, for example, that genuine dialogue in the phenomenological tradition is an experience of meeting between individuals while in the spiritual tradition it emerges from a shared atemporal moment" (Craig, 2015, p. 361). 

Buddhist Tradition (Craig & Xiong, 2022)

  • Communication is the individual's attunement to enlightenment. 
  • Problems of communication involve barriers to enlightenment such as self-centeredness and ego-attachment. 
Buddhism, a long-standing religious and philosophical tradition that significantly influences Asian communication concepts and practices, developed from teachings of the Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, who lived in ancient India during the 6th or 5th century BCE. While diverse Buddhist traditions exist (Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana), they share core beliefs like the Four Noble Truths, enlightenment, and the interconnectedness of all living things. The Buddhist tradition conceptualizes communication as an individual's attunement to enlightenment, which encompasses both the communication process of becoming enlightened and an ultimate ideal state of communication.  Individuals in this tradition are "conditioned" rather than self-contained agents, yet retain the capacity for "becoming" through Buddhist practices. Causality is a process of "interdependent co-arising" rather than linear cause and effect. "Attunement" highlights mindfulness, harmony, and interconnectedness, emphasizing both inner mind development and the outer world. Consciousness is central, with mind development crucial for enlightenment, achieved through practices like meditation. Enlightenment, similar to nirvana, is a practice-based experience, attainable gradually or suddenly, through the Eightfold Path. This path involves ethical thinking, living, and relating, beginning with understanding the Four Noble Truths. Buddhism challenges social hierarchies, emphasizing moral equality, and stresses individual experience over reliance on language or authority. Buddhism shares (Western) phenomenology's focus on individual consciousness but in a metaphysical context that shapes communication differently. And although it has much in common with the spiritual tradition, Buddhism embraces not a dualistic (temporal-atemporal) but rather a "tri-world" (human-natural-supernatural) conception of reality and regards the material world as an illusion to be overcome in enlightenment. 

Confucian Tradition (Craig & Xiong, 2022)

  • Communication is harmonious social interaction.
  • Problems of communication involve conditions that threaten social harmony, such as lack of personal cultivation or failure to perform traditional rituals and rites.
Confucianism, a prominent philosophical tradition derived from teachings of the Chinese scholar Confucius (c. 551- c. 479 BCE), has significantly influenced East Asian societies, shaping everything from governance to interpersonal relationships, particularly for Chinese and Koreans. Confucianism offers a coherent system of thinking about communication, emphasizing moral speech that reflects self-cultivation and fosters harmonious relationships. Key concepts like guanxi (social relations), mientzu (face), he (harmony), and uye-ri (reciprocity) are used to understand Asian communication. Chen's harmony theory highlights ren (humanism), yi (righteousness), and li (propriety) as guiding principles. Confucian communication is viewed as harmonious social interaction, prioritizing social harmony over individual enlightenment. This harmony stems from individual virtue and ethical communication, requiring constant attunement to ethical principles and the interplay of yin and yang. The five ethical principles (ren, yi, li, zhi, xin) are interdependent and crucial for moral self-cultivation. Confucianism emphasizes the individual's role in creating harmonious relationships, extending from family to the cosmos. While valuing harmony, it acknowledges conflict, advocating for its resolution towards greater harmony. It promotes individual moral cultivation as the basis of social order, but also acknowledges hierarchical social positions based on virtue. This creates a tension between dynamic adaptation and static rites, leading to both criticism and creative adaptations of the tradition.   

*****

Questions? Comments? Please post a comment on this blog or email me (Robert.Craig@Colorado.edu).

Further Reading

Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9(2), 119-161. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.1999.tb00355.x 

Craig, R. T. (2007). Pragmatism in the field of communication theory. Communication Theory, 17(2), 125-145. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2885.2007.00292.x 

Craig, R. T. (2009a). Traditions of communication theory. In S. W. Littlejohn & K. A. Foss (Eds.), Encyclopedia of Communication Theory (Vol. 2, pp. 958-963). Sage. 

Craig, R. T. (2009b). Reflection on "Communication Theory as a Field". Revue internationale de communication sociale et publique, 2009(2), 7-11. https://doi.org/10.4000/communiquer.346 

Craig, R. T. (2015). The constitutive metamodel: A 16-year review. Communication Theory, 25(4), 356-374. https://doi.org/10.1111/comt.12076 

Craig, R. T. (2016). Traditions of communication theory. In K. B. Jensen & R. T. Craig (Eds.), The International Encyclopedia of Communication Theory and Philosophy (Vol. 4, pp. 2068-2077). Wiley Blackwell. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118766804.wbiect11 

Craig, R. T., & Muller, H. L. (Eds.). (2007). Theorizing communication: Readings across traditions. Sage. 

Craig, R. T., & Xiong, B. (2022). Traditions of communication theory and the potential for multicultural dialogue. Journal of Multicultural Discourses, 17(1), 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1080/17447143.2021.2009487 

Rich, M. H. (2015). Spiritual debate in communication theory: Craig's metamodel applied. Journal of Communication and Religion, 38(2), 134-153. https://doi.org/10.5840/jcr201538213 

Rich, M. H., & Robles, J. S. (Eds.). (2021). Practicing communication theory: Exploring, applying, and teaching the constitutive metamodel. Cognella. 

Friday, May 22, 2020

My Path to the Constitutive Metamodel

Portions of this post are adapted from the text of a chapter to appear in Practicing Communication Theory: Exploring, Applying, and Teaching the Constitutive Metamodel, edited by Marc H. Rich and Jessica S. Robles, forthcoming from Cognella. 

This post recounts the intellectual journey that took me to my 1999 article, "Communication Theory as a Field" (hereafter CTF), in which I first presented the (in)famous Seven Traditions of Communication Theory. Much of what I've been writing in this blog grows out of ideas in that article. Warning: this is a theory-heavy piece. If I were Paul Krugman writing about economics in The New York Times, I'd call it "wonkish." It's mainly for communication theory wonks. 

CTF proposed that we think of communication theory as a field of "metadiscursive practice" - a field of discourse about discourse, dialogue and debate across a range of intellectual traditions for the purpose of informing and cultivating the ordinary metadiscourse about communication problems and practices that already goes on in society. This is the “constitutive metamodel” of communication theory, so-called because it is a model of models that would constitute the field as a conversation about alternative models for constituting the practice of communication. According to this metamodel, communication theory aspires to have a practical function in the world. By developing and disseminating through society the various traditions of thought in which communication has been conceptualized, the practice of communication theory enables people to reflect on problems from multiple perspectives as they deliberate on how best to communicate. 

One confusion people sometimes have about CTF results from their assumption that its scheme of seven theoretical traditions is a model of the communication discipline in which the traditions represent subdisciplinary areas of study. On this interpretation CTF is oddly out of sync with the field’s current structure, much of which is simply missing from the metamodel. Where, for example, is the media studies tradition? What about the public relations tradition? In truth, however, CTF was never intended to represent the disciplinary substructure of communication studies. Instead, it was one thread of a larger project on communication as a practical discipline (Craig, 1989). Elsewhere I have told the story of how that larger project emerged from my personal struggles with the science-humanities divide in communication studies, beginning as an undergraduate in the late 1960s (Craig, 2006). The following paragraphs trace my thinking on communication theory through the 1980s and ‘90s to the 1999 publication of CTF. 

My work on the idea of a practical discipline began around 1980 and centered on the premise that communication is a field of practical activities that can develop into practical arts with the assistance of systematic research, theory, and criticism. The Aristotelian art of rhetoric was a model that we could update by incorporating techniques of modern science and applying it to modern communicative activities to create a practical discipline of communication. 

My theoretical interests in the 1980s were mainly epistemological. Steeped in the philosophy of science, I was trying to articulate the specific kind of knowledge that a practical discipline would produce and how it would differ from traditional conceptions of knowledge in the sciences, arts, and humanities. I was reading in social science metatheory, pragmatism, hermeneutics, rhetoric, and critical social theory and wondering how to position a practical discipline among those categories. As always, I conducted my education in public by having my theory seminar students read the very things I was struggling to understand. 

From the early 1980s into the 2000s I worked intermittently on a book about communication as a practical discipline that I never managed to complete. Material written for the book was spun off as convention papers, articles and book chapters, but my working outline of the book kept changing as I explored different aspects of the idea of a practical discipline. The first decade’s work culminated in a major essay (Craig 1989) that I intended to revise as the first chapter of my book. Another spinoff, Grounded Practical Theory (Craig and Tracy 1995; 2021), grew from (and rather outgrew) a section of the methodology chapter. CTF in 1999 was yet another spinoff from the book project, culminating a line of work that began in the early 1990s.

Early draft outlines of my book-in-progress in the 1980s included chapters on the history and concept of the communication discipline, practical theory, methodology, and a shifting array of subsidiary problems like prescriptivism, authenticity, and intimate arts, but no chapter squarely focused on the subject matter of communication theory. Filling that gap became a priority for me around 1990, probably for several reasons. I became the founding editor of a new journal, Communication Theory, and worried about what it should publish. I took a faculty position at Colorado, where communication theory became my main teaching responsibility, and I worried about what to teach. Amid all of that, I worried that my writings on communication as a practical discipline had had a lot to say about practical and discipline but notably very little about the concept of communication! I was reading work by James Carey, Stanley Deetz, W. Barnett Pearce, Robyn Penman, John Peters, Gregory Shepherd, Stuart Sigman, and others, all interrogating the concept of communication, centering the communication discipline on that concept, and advancing some variation of what I came to call a constitutive model of communication. 

By 1994, my book outline included a chapter on communication theory that opened with the point that definitions of communication reconstruct communication problems and practices and went on to list a series of “traditions” of communication theory (rhetoric, semiotics, cybernetics, media theory, social psychology, and dialogue). The chapter outline claimed that tensions among the traditions defined central problems of communication theory and concluded that other traditions (nonacademic, nonwestern) also should be engaged. In a 1994 Speech Communication Association convention paper, I reviewed the literature on the constitutive model of communication and argued that the transmission model was still useful for some purposes. Influenced by Carey’s (1989) discussion of the reflexive relationship between communication theory and culture, I argued that communication theory should respond to the problem of communication as it is variously experienced in contemporary societies, and that theory should interpret, critique and suggest alternatives reconstructions of communication as a cultural practice. 

In 1994-1995, I was evidently grappling with some questions that that convention paper had left unanswered. Methodologically, how could the reflexive relationship between theory and practice be operationalized in a practical discipline, and how could the multifarious contents of communication theory be adapted to the purposes of such a discipline?  I was already thinking in terms of theoretical traditions, but the idea of a tradition was undeveloped. Influenced by Talbot Taylor (1992), I began to see metadiscourse as a key concept for relating theories to each other and theory to practice, but my research in discourse analysis (which had been going on since the late 1970s) led me to interpret the concept differently from Taylor. 

By the time of a March 1995 colloquium talk at Colorado, the title and a rough outline of “Communication Theory as a Field” had emerged, using concepts from Taylor’s (1992) critique of language theories to conceive the broader field of communication theory as one in which: 
"…communication theories are mutually relevant (constitute a field) because they are relevant to a common practical world; they present alternative ways of conceptualizing communication problems and practices; theoretical metadiscourse draws topoi from, and becomes a source of topoi for, practical metadiscourse, and produces both theoretical as well as practical innovation.” (unpublished handout dated March 8, 1995) 
In that talk, I sketched seven traditions (rhetoric, semiotics, social psychology/psychology, social psychology/sociology, phenomenology, cybernetics, and media theory) and posed, as a discussion question, “Which commonplaces of practical metadiscourse are appealed to, and which are problematized, by each tradition of communication theory?” 

It may have been while preparing that colloquium that I set out jogging one morning, as I have often recounted, my head roiling with nebulous thoughts on the traditions of communication theory and returned home an hour later with a list of seven traditions that I promptly wrote down. The memory is vivid and makes a fun anecdote but is a bit misleading. I must have had some epiphany on that day’s run but by then I had been toying with lists of traditions and pondering metadiscourse, etc., for some time.  Critical theory was not yet on my list of traditions, probably because I was still seeing it as an epistemological stance without a distinct concept of communication, a view I eventually rejected. The list of traditions continued to evolve as the manuscript of CFT developed slowly through the following two years.  

I presented a more fully developed version in October 1996 as the Second Annual Lecture in Human Communication at Indiana University. In that version, the last three traditions were now Social Psychology, Interactionism and Critical Theory, and each tradition was presented along with a sketch of commonplaces that it appeals to and challenges, practical problems that it orients to, and conflicts with other traditions that suggest research problems. That November I submitted a partial draft for presentation at the International Communication Association convention the following May. 

In the spring of 1997, I continued working on the manuscript while teaching a doctoral seminar on communication theory that followed the essay’s outline and assigned readings and student presentations on each of the seven traditions. The semester’s final reading was a draft of CTF that presented a rough version of the metamodel in one table and a half-completed matrix of arguments across traditions in a second table. I completed the manuscript, submitted it to Communication Theory on June 10, 1997, and received, dated October 26, 1997, one of those daunting “revise and resubmit” decisions accompanied by three detailed peer reviews, all very thoughtful, which raised good issues that took me some time to address in a revision that was finally submitted in mid-1998. 

It wasn’t until a second revision, submitted that fall, trying to clarify the paper’s organization, that I formulated the metamodel’s two principles: the constitutive model as a metamodel, and communication theory as metadiscursive practice. Another minor revision submitted that later fall was accepted by the then-editor of Communication Theory, James Anderson, in December 1998 and, after some final tinkering, appeared in print the following May. The rest is history. 

References & Further Reading

Carey, J. W. (1989). Communication as culture: Essays on media and society. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman.

Craig, R. T. (1989). Communication as a practical discipline. In B. Dervin, L. Grossberg, B. J. O'Keefe & E. Wartella (Eds.), Rethinking communication; Volume 1: Paradigm issues (pp. 97-122). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Craig, R. T. (1999). Communication theory as a field. Communication Theory, 9(2), 119-161. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1999.tb00355.x

Craig, R. T. (2006). A path through the methodological divides. Keio Communication Review, 28, 9-17. http://www.mediacom.keio.ac.jp/publication/pdf2006/review28/01_Brenda%20DERVIN.pdf

Craig, R. T. (2015). The constitutive metamodel: A 16-year review. Communication Theory, 25(4), 356-374. doi: 10.1111/comt.12076
 
Craig, R. T., & Tracy, K. (1995). Grounded practical theory: The case of intellectual discussion. Communication Theory, 5(3), 248-272. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2885.1995.tb00108.x

Craig, R. T., & Tracy, K. (2021). Grounded practical theory: Investigating communication problems. San Diego: Cognella.

Taylor, T. J. (1992). Mutual misunderstanding: Scepticism and the theorizing of language and interpretation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.


Friday, May 8, 2020

War as a Model (Not Just a Metaphor) for Communication

Earlier I raised the question, "Is Communication the Solution to War and Violence?" A little thought revealed that the answer isn't going to be simple. The idealistic belief that war and violence always arise from breakdowns in communication and can be prevented or resolved by good communication is attractive but unfortunately simplistic. I do think communication can serve to build more peaceful relationships, and finding better ways to do so is a worthy goal for communication research to pursue, but a realistic approach to the problem has to grapple with complexities.

Is communication the opposite of violence? Not necessarily! For one thing, violence can be a form of communication when it carries messages. For example, nations can use military attacks not just to fight wars but also as warning signals to prevent wars. As I demonstrate below, it can even be argued theoretically that communication, far from being the opposite of war and violence, is essentially war by other means. If that were true, then the language of war wouldn't be just a metaphorical way of talking about communication that critics think is overused. If communication is essentially war by other means, then we should literally be using war as a conceptual model for understanding and guiding the practice of communication. I myself don't buy that argument in the end, but I do think it has something to contribute to the more complex understanding of communication that we need.

To be clear, the war model of communication is not widely known. You won't find it in current textbooks. By no stretch is it a trendy idea or, in my judgment, likely to become one. In fact, I have found exactly one communication theorist who has seriously defended this idea in print, though he marshals a formidable array of classic and postmodern thinkers to back up his position.

Stefan Sonderling, an associate professor of communication and media studies at the University of South Africa and a former journalist, has written a dissertation and several articles on the theme that communication is war by other means. In the following I sketch my interpretation of his argument (as presented in the three articles listed below under Further Reading) and I conclude with some brief critical comments. With Sonderling's theory "on the record" for further discussion in this blog, no doubt I'll have more to say about it in future posts.

Sonderling's argument in a nutshell is that communication is inherently warlike, which is a good thing in his opinion because war is better than peace. 

Communication is warlike, for Sonderling, because it has developed through human evolution and history as part of the ongoing struggle for survival that has bred "the agonistic character of human nature" (2013, p. 3). Human nature is agonistic (prone to conflict) because the struggle for existence has always required competition for scarce resources, and the winners in that competition are usually the fiercest and best resourced warriors. Since prehistoric times, warfare has been "a universal and constant feature of human life" (2014, p. 155). It's true that the struggle for survival is not purely competitive but also requires cooperation with others to secure collective resources and defeat enemies. Love and kindness for the in-group, hatred and cruelty for the out-group would seem the ideal pattern, but the reality is mixed. Even within cooperative groups there are conflicting interests and struggles for power to establish social hierarchies and set the terms for cooperation. We fight with our friends and our enemies. We are an agonistic species. 

Conflict in the struggle for existence is not always overtly violent. Much of it goes on symbolically through other forms of communication, now ranging from international propaganda and information wars to snits and snubs in everyday talk and competitive virtue signaling (or just making ourselves look good) on social media. Theories often picture communication as a basically cooperative activity in which we can achieve understanding and agreement with each other by following established rules of language and interaction. Against those theories, Sonderling cites postmodernist writers such as Michel Foucault, Jean-François Lyotard and Pierre Bourdieu to argue that the underlying reality of human interaction, underneath whatever veneer of politeness and affection, is a fight, a warlike struggle for power and control, an adversarial game in which the object is to win (2013, pp. 2-5; 2014, pp. 160-165). 

If this war model of communication has always been true, postmodernist theory asserts it is especially useful for understanding the "postmodern condition" of our present world. In the postmodern condition, partly because of developments in communication and media, unified cultures and belief systems have increasingly broken down, leaving society in a fragmented state of "conflictual diversity" (2013, p. 2). As Sonderling writes (2013, p. 14), "Any attempt to understand the postmodern world, globalisation and the spread of communication technology is confronted with a perplexing paradox of integration and fragmentation." He concludes (2013, p. 15) that "one could describe the postmodern world as a return to the Middle Ages or as a neomedieval age" of disorder and constant warfare.

But Sonderling goes further. For him, the war model of communication is not only true, it is good because it can foster renewed appreciation for the positive value of war as a structuring principle for life. Here he parts ways with postmodernist theorists like Lyotard whose relativistic stance toward diversity and dissent in society leaves us with no moral basis for mounting a defense against real "mortal enemies" such as international terrorists (2013, p. 13). Sonderling aligns himself with a tradition in Western thought going back to the ancient Greeks that has celebrated warrior virtues and war as a noble way of life. As he writes (2012, p. 67), "From the time of antiquity, war was always considered to be synonymous with life, strength, well being and expansion, while peace was associated with rest, stagnation and death." While death is the inevitable end of every human life, war gives life and death a clarity of purpose and meaning. Forcing us to draw clear lines between friends and enemies, war creates the experience of powerful human bonds: "Human beings can only gain a proper sense of their humanity through war and strife. A world without enemies is also a world without friends, hence it is no longer a human world..." (2012, p. 66).

Maybe the most provocative thread of Sonderling's argument is his attack against peace discourse, claiming that the ideal of peace is not only unrealistic but deeply deceptive and evil in its consequences. "The idea of eternal peace is a utopian myth, because the decisive process that shapes individuals and social life is the dynamics of power relations" (2012, p. 66). As long as humans unavoidably tangle over power and control, there will be wars as there always have been. War is the ultimate resolution of conflicts that can never be resolved by mere communication because they are not caused by misunderstandings but by clashes of real material interests in the struggle for survival. Peace discourse is deceptive because it denies the reality that power and violence are the basis of society. Far from being the opposite of violence, peace actually depends on violence. "Peace is synonymous with predictable social order that can be achieved through repressive law-enforcement" (2012, p. 69). It only exists where there is a monopoly of power strong enough to suppress violent conflicts. In effect, peace discourse is an effort to gain power by deception. It demands that we talk about conflict in the the peaceful, therapeutic language of "dialogue" and "conversation" and that we must stop using the violent language of "war" against "enemies." It "assumes that by manipulating, distorting and directing language, people will not be able to think about defending themselves against danger, ensuring their own domination and being rewarded with a peaceful life" (2012, p. 72). In this view, the ultimate evil of pacifism is that it denies us the right to defend ourselves against enemies.

In sum, Sonderling's argument is quite a rant, and the case that he makes for a war model of communication has serious weaknesses, but he is right about some things. He is probably right that there is an "agonistic" streak in human character that has always been there and is not going away, and that pugnacious streak will continue to run through much of our communication. He is right that conflicts generally arise from incompatible interests and commitments, not just misunderstandings, and that conflict resolution cannot be achieved by merely talking nice or expressing ourselves more clearly but has to address the real matters at stake. He is right that communication theory cannot ignore the power dynamics that are always at play in human relationships, and that "peace" is a structure of power, not the absence of power. In this regard, the postmodernist take on "conflictual diversity" in society may be a good starting point for thinking about what peaceful communication would look like, but Sonderling is right to reject postmodernism's relativistic celebration of diversity and dissent. If peace is a structure of power, then the goal of communication has to be a just peace, not peace at any price. We cannot entirely avoid moral judgment and taking sides, fighting for what we believe to be right, or, in extreme circumstances, even going to war. Sonderling is right to be critical of peace discourse to the extent that it denies these realities. 

But none of this justifies Sonderling's unqualified celebration of war as a positive good. He quotes the title of Chris Hedges' poignant 2003 book, "war is a force that gives us meaning," but he fails to note that Hedges saw this attraction to war as a temptation we should resist, not a positive good we should seek. War is no longer, if it ever was, exclusively an arena in which heroic warriors battle courageously to defend their countrymen. Yes, there are heroes, and yes, courage in battle and willingness to sacrifice one's life to save others in a just cause are admirable qualities, and we should be thankful to those who do so on our behalf. But most of the carnage and destruction caused by war, especially modern war, is not suffered by those brave warriors. For many of its victims, and indeed for many of the warriors, war is not a force that gives them meaning; it is a senseless catastrophe. War, at best, is a necessary evil, not something we should celebrate for itself. If fighting spirit and warrior virtues are insistent and sometimes admirable human tendencies that we should cultivate in peacetime, they can be channeled into nonlethal activities like athletic competitions, political activism, or battles against natural forces that threaten us (climate change?) as recommended by William James in his famous 1906 essay on "The Moral Equivalent of War." (Though admittedly, James's "warfare against nature" may not be the best way of framing climate change action or anything else.) In any case, the virtues that Sonderling celebrates are quintessentially male virtues, and his world view seems perfectly masculinist. Feminism has made us aware of other virtues that are worth cultivating in people of all genders. 

As for models of communication, Sonderling isolates one human tendency - agonism - and arbitrarily treats it as the essence of humanity. True, power dynamics operate in all human relationships. Theories of relational communication generally identify power as one dimension along with affection or closeness as a another dimension, and much else also goes on in human communication. I'm sure we can find a legitimate place for agonism in our models without implying that communication is always warlike or that it should be as warlike as possible. 

Further Reading

Hedges, C. (2003). War is a force that gives us meaning. New York: Anchor Books.

Sonderling, S. (2012). Eternal peace of the graveyard: The language of peace discourse and the construction of the global humanitarian concentration camp. Communicatio, 38(1), 64-83. doi: 10.1080/02500167.2011.627566

Sonderling, S. (2013). To speak is to fight : War as structure of thought in Lyotard's postmodern condition. Communicare : Journal for Communication Sciences in Southern Africa, 32(2), 1-19. https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/sabinet/comcare/2013/00000032/00000002/art00002

Sonderling, S. (2014). Communication is war by other means: Towards a war-centric communication theory for the 21st century. Communicatio, 40(2), 155-171. doi: 10.1080/02500167.2014.918900

Saturday, April 25, 2020

#WeSeeYou and #Sawubona (Part 2)

image
Image source: https://rochemamabolo.wordpress.com/2018/03/12/sawubona-more-than-just-a-zulu-greeting/

In Part 1 we saw how the Twitter hashtag #WeSeeYou has evolved since it first appeared on Black Twitter in 2009. Initially, #WeSeeYou was mostly a somewhat playful way of calling out another person's pretentious, hypocritical, or evasive behavior, such as sneaking a look at someone or denying a personal failing that was obvious to others. A decade later the hashtag is still used in that way, especially on Black Twitter, but by now has been taken up by a wide range of Twitter users to express different, sometimes contradictory meanings including condemnation, contempt, recognition, solidarity, gratitude, and sympathy.

Searching online for connections between #WeSeeYou and African American culture, I found that the phrase "we see you" (not just the hashtag) does seem to have some cultural resonance in fields ranging from popular music to religion. One connection that turned up and seemed especially promising as a potential source of cultural insight was sawubona--a Zulu (Southern African) social greeting term that translates as "we see you."

I've found very little about sawubona in English academic literature. The word appears in Google Books searches from the 1960s on, in Zulu language textbooks, tourist guides, and some ethnographic writings. Its occurrence in English has grown rapidly since the end of the South African apartheid regime in in the 1990s, as the following chart illustrates.


Lately, sawubona seems to have become something of a buzzword in commercial contexts, where it can serve as a branding device to associate an enterprise with authentic indigenous roots of Southern African culture. For example, the South African Airways in-flight magazine is Sawubona.

The image at the top of this post was taken from the blog of Roche Mamabolo, "an author, blogger, entrepreneur, mentor and most of all, a teacher" who runs an entrepreneurship consultancy in South Africa and Botswana. Mamabolo introduced the concept sawubono in a 2018 blog post:
Sawubona, is an ancient isiZulu greeting which means: We see you. It is equivalent to Hello and Namaste. 
So when we meet and greet I would say “sawubona” [we see you], and you will respond by saying “yebo, sawubona” [yes, we see you too]. 
Why do we say “We” see you even when it is just me, a single individual person greeting you and why do you respond by the same when it is just you, a single individual person greeting me? 
In Zulu tradition, the “I” is connection to an ancient lineage of ancestors which my ancestors are always with me. 
So when I meet you, not only is myself meeting you, but my ancestors whom I’m representing meet you too. 
So sawubona [we see you] means me and my ancestors see you, and your response means you and your ancestors sees me too.
Mamabolo goes on to explain that sawubona "is more than just a greeting, it also means: we see each other, we acknowledge each other, we recognize each other ... a deep witnessing and presence [that] invites us to communicate." Drawing a business lesson, he concludes: "as entrepreneurs, we need to not only greet our customers, but we need to acknowledge them, to recognise them, to witness them, their feelings, their aspirations."

Bridget Edwards, a South African psychological consultant and author, offers a similar explanation of sawubona, except she translates it as "I see you" (rather than "we see you") and derives a more self-focused lesson: "it is only when we actually ‘see’ ourselves and acknowledge our own inner greatness that we have the capacity to recognise this in another."

In the United States, sawubona has appeared in discussions of multicultural education and ethics of artificial intelligence as well as organizational leadership. Although some sources link sawubona to the larger theme of African Ubuntu philosophy, none that I have found explores that connection in any depth.

#Sawubona is also used as a Twitter hashtag, but (interestingly) almost never in conjunction with #WeSeeYou. I've found only four tweets with both hashtags, one of which is my own tweet announcing Part 1 of this article. The others relate to transgender rights (a movement that has understandably embraced #WeSeeYou) and to the "Sawubona Award" given by the Pan African Network, an organization that supports Pan African multicultural education. Here they are:


These tweets use #WeSeeYou in positive senses of recognition, celebration and solidarity. A larger number of tweets, but still only a few dozen, many of them from that same Pan African Network, combine #Sawubona with the phrase (not hashtag) "we see you." Most of those tweets are celebratory in a Black cultural context. Many more tweets use #Sawubona without #WeSeeYou or "we see you." They are quite various and hard to generalize about, but many of them come from South Africa and have a commercial reference, including popular music. Quite a few others come from a religious context of African or African American Christianity.

~~~~~~~~~~

So, what can we conclude from all this? And so what ... why should we care?

Recall that this mini-investigation began out of curiosity about the hashtag #WeSeeYou, just because it seemed to have so many different meanings. A little sleuthing traced the hashtag to Black Twitter, where it was first used in 2009, and so I wondered how its origins might be connected to African American culture. The typically teasing, somewhat jocular tone of those earliest tweets might suggest some relation to traditions of verbal sparing in African American communities, but why "we see you?" Where did that phrase come from?

To that question I've found no definite answer. For a while I thought #Sawubona might be the key to a deep connection between #WeSeeYou and African traditions. That remains a possibility, and the connection (perhaps traceable through Ubuntu philosophy) may be obvious to cultural insiders or scholars better informed than I am, but I haven't found any academic literature on the question. In current usage, #Sawubona is closely related to positive senses of #WeSeeYou, such as recognition and solidarity, that have appeared on Twitter through the last decade, very unlike the unmasking of pretension and hypocrisy featured in the earliest uses of #WeSeeYou on Black Twitter. #Sawubona is a recent trend that partly has to do with South African national branding. Clearly, #WeSeeYou did not originate directly from #Sawubona.

My best guess at present is that the most direct cultural source of #WeSeeYou is African American Christianity or Christianity in general, traceable to the biblical passage (from Matthew 25) that I quoted earlier: "Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you, or thirsty and give you something to drink? When did we see you a stranger and invite you in, or needing clothes and clothe you? When did we see you sick or in prison and go to visit you?"

This Christian sense of "we see you" as recognition and caring for others is pretty different from the early use of #WeSeeYou on Black Twitter, but it is quite possible for a culturally available expression to be taken up and used ironically in verbal play. Maybe that's where #WeSeeYou came from. That really is just a plausible guess, not a research finding, but I probably haven't emphasized enough how common the phrase "we see you" is in Christian discourses. The Christian connection is not a minor thread, and it also helps to explain other senses of #WeSeeYou that we observed on Twitter, senses like recognition, celebration, appreciation, solidarity, sympathy and support.

A search for the cultural origins of #WeSeeYou is not a search for its "true" or "correct" meaning in metadiscourse, because there is no such thing. Every common way of using #WeSeeYou is valid in the discourse communities that have adopted it for their own purposes, whether they be police supporters, right wing conspiracy theorists, or transgender activists. There is much more here to explore, if one is interested. For example, in the discourse of the #MeToo movement, #WeSeeYou is often paired with another hashtag, #WeBelieveYou, which adds another thread of meaning.

I think we should care about this, if only to better appreciate the creative richness of ordinary human culture and communication.

Thursday, March 26, 2020

What Kind of Problem is the Coronavirus?

"All problems can be stated as problems of communication." So wrote the philosopher Richard McKeon in a classic essay, "Communication, Truth, and Society" (1957). Notice he didn't claim that all problems ARE problems of communication, only that they "can be stated" as such. Without using the word, in the current jargon of communication theory he was referring to how we "frame" problems, what aspects we select and emphasize as we think and talk about them.

For McKeon, you frame a communication problem by considering "what is said and how what is meant might be influenced by communication." That is, you begin with what people are saying about a situation from their different perspectives and engage them in a deliberative discussion to seek agreement on what is going on and what needs to be done. The communication frame is really a meta-frame because it acknowledges the conflicts among different ways that people are framing a complex problem and the need to resolve those conflicts through communication in order to move forward together.

The current crisis certainly fits that description. The COVID-19 pandemic is a complex problem, really a multitude of problems that that become apparent as you consider the situation from different points of view. In a biological frame, the problem is a new virus that causes illness and death, and to solve that problem we need effective vaccines and medical treatments. In a public health frame, which relates microbiology to social behavior, the more urgent problem is that the virus transmits easily and can only be contained by practices such as social distancing and disinfectant cleaning. By now we've all learned that "flattening the curve" of disease transmission by these means is necessary to prevent the medical system from being overwhelmed--a frame that shifts the focus to problems like equipment shortages and overstretched health care providers, and from there to systemic failures that have caused the shortages and left us unprepared for an emergency the medical and public health systems should have anticipated. Shortsighted political leadership let it all happen.

And then ... all the other problems! Cries of pain arise from everywhere. Sick people who can't be tested for the virus because tests are unavailable. "Essential" workers who risk exposure. Homeless people especially vulnerable. Parents needing to self-isolate or work remotely with kids home from school. Kids who can't play with their friends. Slow or no internet. #zoomfails. No carrots or toilet paper at the supermarket. Neighbors worried about joggers who breathe too hard, spewing who-knows-what as they run through the neighborhood (really). Disorientation, anxiety, loneliness, domestic conflict and abuse. Stock markets tanking. Businesses and nonprofits facing ruin. Millions thrown out of work and without health insurance. All of these problems causing still other problems, and so it goes.

"What is said" includes all of that and more. How can we put it together? Meta-frames compete to dominate the discourse. Right now, the public health frame is clearly on top. In that frame, regardless of all other problems, the first thing we must do is to flatten the curve. On the advice of public health experts, governments invoke emergency powers, ordering businesses to shut down and everyone who can to "shelter in place."

Rising to compete with public health is an economic frame in which you can argue that the public health "cure" will be worse than the pandemic disease if it leads to economic collapse, as many fear it will. In a right wing version of this frame, public health solutions carry unacceptable costs in personal and economic freedom, and liberals are using the pandemic--essentially just a really bad flu season that we could weather--as an excuse to expand government regulatory power and social entitlements like universal health care. (The argument strongly resembles right wing climate change skepticism, with public health experts standing in for climate scientists in the role of liberal tools.)

More mainstream versions of the economic frame admit the need for strong public health measures (COVID-19 is NOT the flu!) but look for ways to limit the economic damage. Public health arguments compare short term economic shutdown to cancer chemotherapy or medically induced coma--harsh measures unfortunately necessary to save the live of a patient who will hopefully recover as a result. In the economic frame you worry that short term economic shutdown will impoverish a generation and you look for some compromise to minimize the damage.

Interestingly, it seems to be this moderate economic position that most often pivots to the communication meta-frame: We need to talk about this problem. Public health measures are necessary but we can't let them go too far. We need to find some compromise that saves the economy. This argument is perhaps necessitated by a power equation. Right now, the public health frame rules the discourse. When you don't have the power to dictate a result, you call for "communication." As I write, the United States Congress has communicated in its own peculiar way and come up with a compromise in the form of a huge economic stimulus package that leaves harsh public health measures untouched but answers many economic cries of pain--though not all and probably not very equitably.

The communication meta-frame has some power insofar as it is embedded in democratic political institutions and the culture at large. McKeon noted a cultural shift that was becoming apparent as he wrote in the 1950's, more than six decades ago: a growing tendency to see the problems that we face as problems of communication. McKeon speculated that society's awareness of communication problems had grown "as a result of the invention of instruments of communication and the massive extension of their use" -- a process that has only accelerated in recent times. He argued that we should state our problems as problems of communication in a pluralistic, democratic society that wants to solve problems without suppressing the diversity of viewpoints, and that we need to cultivate the art of deliberative rhetoric as a means to that end.

The alternative would be an authoritarian system that knows the one, officially "right" truth and does the one "right" thing, without discussion. It may be hard to hold on to the communication frame at a time when the one right thing to do seems obvious, as determined by experts, and in truth, problems are not always best stated as problems of communication. We don't need to communicate about a simple math problem. Some problems are like that. Other problems, including most of the real problems that we face, are complex and involve multiple conflicting interests, values and technical capabilities. Those problems need to be stated as problems of communication and we need better ways of talking about them.

Further Reading

McKeon, R. (1957). Communication, truth, and society. Ethics, 67, 89-99.